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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DANNA K. BEACH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 19389

THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH, et al.,
Defendants/Respondents.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a summary judgment in favor of
respondents upon a personal injury claim brought by appellant
Danna K. Beach, a 20-year-old university student who was
injured after she climbed, and fell off, rocks while alone
late at night on a biology class field trip.

Appellant

claims the respondents are liable to her because the class
instructor and his teaching assistant failed to protect her
from injuring herself after she had been drinking that
night.

The parties will be designated as they appeared below.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT

The Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County,
the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson presiding, granted

defendants' joint Motion for Summary Judgment.

Judgment was

entered in favor of all defendants and against plaintiff on
July 27, 1983.

[R. 405-07].
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Defendants ask this Court to affirm the judgment of the
lower court.
QUESTIONS ON APPEAL
1.

Whether a university has a duty to protect an adult

plaintiff who is under no disability (or impaired only as a
result of her voluntary intoxication) from carelessly injuring herself on an open and obvious hazard while off-campus
and on her own time?
2.

Whether a plaintiff may use her own voluntary intox-

ication and knowing violation of state laws which prohibit
consumption of liquor by persons under 21 to support a claim
that defendants were negligent in allowing her to drink and
become intoxicated?
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendants acknowledge that in reviewing the granting of
a summary judgment this Court sits in the same position as
the trial court and the evidence is to be viewed in the light
most favorable to plaintiff, the party against whom judgment
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was entered.
1977).

Durham v. Margetts, 571 P.2d 1332, 1334 (Utah

Therefore, plaintiff's own account of this matter, as

set forth in her depositions taken July 27, 1981, and January
20, 1982, is taken as true.

To the extent plaintiff has no

recollection of certain events the uncontroverted testimony
of other witnesses will be used.
A.

INTRODUCTION

The gravamen of plaintiff's Complaint is her allegation
that defendants failed to provide her with adequate supervision and protection on the field trips given their knowledge
of her "problems" with drinking and becoming disoriented in
the dark.

Plaintiff argues defendants had a duty to see to

it that she didn't drink on field trips and, if she did, that
they lead her to her campsite tent each night.

[R. 699:

Brief of Appellant, p. 40].
A claim of inadequate supervision must be evaluated in
light of the surrounding circumstances.

In order for this

Court to evaluate plaintiff's claim, the Court must be
advised concerning (1) plaintiff's background, knowledge and
maturity level, and (2) the situation existing at the time of
plaintiff's accident.
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B.

PLAINTIFF'S BACKGROUND

The accident in question occurred in late May 1979.
Plaintiff was then of majority age, just three months short
[R. 652, p. 21].

of her twenty-first birthday.

She was

independent, not used to being looked after by others, and
had already widely experienced the freedoms associated with
being an adult.
Plaintiff Danna Beach was raised by her mother in
Thermopolis, Wyoming.

[R. 652, p. 6].

Since graduation from

high school in 1976 she has been on her own.

Plaintiff has

moved often and traveled widely both for educational purposes
and her own amusement.

She started college in 1976 as a

freshman at Chadron State, a Nebraska state teacher's
college.

[R. 652, pp. 4,7].

She became dissatisfied there

and transferred to the University of Utah in the fall of
1977, hoping for a better education and anxious to ski.
652, p. 12).

In the summer of 1978 she arranged her own

30-day trip to Ireland as an exchange student.
28-29].

[R.

[R.

652, pp.

Plaintiff traveled as she pleased, without her

mother's approval and usually without her knowledge.
651, p. 61).

(R.

While at the University plaintiff owned a

Volkswagon "Bug", which she maintained herself.

Each school

quarter she would make at least one trip to Cheyenne and
would go on one "crazy trip," as she characterizes those
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"irrational" trips taken when "you should be home studying."
[R. 651, pp. 60-62].

For example, plaintiff had planned a

vacation trip to southern California for the week after the
accident.

[R. 651, p. 61).

Plaintiff paid her own way through school, working a wide
variety of jobs to support herself.

She has been a waitress,

bellhop, cashier, housecleaner, and T.V. camera operator.
[R. 652, pp. B, 16, 31, 38].

Prior to the accident she had

planned to work as a ranch-hand in Wyoming during the summer
of 1979.

[R. 651, p. 84].

In keeping with her independent nature plaintiff prefers
a non-restricted lifestyle.

Like other students, plaintiff

lived in the student dorms her first year at the University
of Utah.

[R. 652, p. 14].

Plaintiff smokes and drinks.

1

As a result of her habits she had some conflicts with
dormitory rules prohibiting student drinking.
17-18, 22-25, 87-BB, 182].

[R. 642, pp.

Plaintiff solved these problems

by moving into an off-campus house in the fall of 1978 with
her cousin Luetta, Luetta's boyfriend, and a former roommate
from the dorms.

(R. 652, pp. 31-33].

Living off-campus

lshe may also make recreational use of marijuana.or
other drugs.
Plaintiff's counsel instructed her during her
depositions not to answer questions regarding her use of such
substances.
(R. 652, pp. 26-28, 64-65, 103, 136: 651, P· BJ•

-5-

allowed plaintiff and her friends to party without worrying
about dorm rules.

[R. 652, pp. 33-36].

Their only concern

then was Utah law, which plaintiff knew prohibited her
drinking until age 21.

[R. 652, PP· 21, 33] •
C.

THE CLASS

In the spring of 1979 plaintiff registered for Biology
180 at the University of Utah.

She was initially attracted

to the course by its description in the University catalog.
[R. 652, p. 39-40].

The class is an elective geared towards

non-biology majors such as plaintiff.

It includes labs and

off-campus field trips designed to give the student a chance
to directly observe and study the ecology and animals of
Utah.

[R. 652, p. 40].

The course was taught Spring Quarter 1979 by defendant
Orlando Cuellar.

[R. 652, p. 39].

Dr. Cuellar is a tenured

associate professor of biology at the University.
p. 7].

[R. 653,

He is an excellent field instructor and popular with

his students.

[R. 656, p. 20].

Dr. Cuellar has taught

Biology 180 at the University each spring quarter since 1977
without any change in the general purpose and content of the
class or field trips.

[R. 618-19; 653, pp. 11-13].

Dr. Cuellar took his Spring 1979 Biology 180 students on
three one-day field trips and three weekend field trips
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during the quarter.

[R. 652, p. 42].

The day trips went to

Tempe Springs, Bear River Bird Refuge and East Canyon.

The

weekend trips were to Lake Powell, Beaver Dam Wash and the
Deep Creek Mountains.
for a specific purpose.

[R. 653, p. 18].

Each area was picked

For instance, the Deep Creek

Mountain range (where plaintiff's accident occurred) was used
to demonstrate an interface between the ecology and zoology
of a Northern Great Basin desert and mountain range.

[R.

545]
Dr. Cuellar is very familiar with all of the field trip
sites, particularly the Deep Creek Mountains.

This mountain

range forms the border between Utah and Nevada, 130 miles
southwest of Salt Lake City.

Since 1975, Dr. Cuellar has

carried on a long-term research project on lizard populations
in the area.

He visits the project site on the average of

three times a year, usually with classes which assist him in
his research.

[R. 653, pp. 69-70, 72-73].

Use of the site

enables Dr. Cuellar to show his Biology 180 students scientific techniques of field observation and specific types of
animal life and vegetation.

[R. 653, pp. 73-75].

Dr. Cuellar had used the same site and campground himself,
and with many classes, prior to May 1979 without any accident
or safety problem.

[R. 249-50].
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Defendant Ron Stewart, a 21-year-old senior from Reno,
Nevada, was Dr. Cuellar's teaching assistant.
652, p. 43].

[R. 440-41;

He was responsible for the class labs and

helped Dr. Cuellar with the field trips.

[R. 448-50).

was a logical choice for the teaching assistant.

Ron

He was

already familiar with the course material and field trips,
having taken the class from Dr. Cuellar the previous spring
quarter.

[R. 446).

Ron is also an experienced outdoorsman

with substantial first-aid training; his father is a medical
doctor.

R. 472, 483-84, 593).

On the first day of class plaintiff met Dr. Cuellar and
Mr. Stewart and received an orientation to the course.

Field

trip schedules were distributed and the field trip sites were
discussed.

[R. 652, pp. 41-42, 44).

Dr. Cuellar told the

students what camping equipment the University would supply
and what equipment they would have to supply themselves, what
clothes they should wear, and what common dangers they might
encounter, e.g. snakes.

[R. 652, p. 41-42; 653, p. 17).

These general introductory instructions were followed up with
more specific ones prior to each field trip.
47, 108; 653, p. 17].

(R. 652, pp.

The students were urged during the

introductory session to drop the class if they would have
trouble completing the field trips.
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(R. 652, pp. 41, 44).

Prior to the first field trip Dr. Cuellar told the class
what conduct he would expect of them while in the field.

The

students were expected to follow Dr. Cuellar's instructions
and directions while they were engaged in class work.

on

overnight trips, once the day's work was completed the students were on their own time and were free to do as they
please.

[R. 652, p. 50: 651, pp. 15-16; 653, pp. 99-100).

The students were told drinking would not be allowed during
class hours since the field work would be rigorous and
require alert minds.

[R. 652, p. 50; 653, pp. 35-36).

After

hours the matter was one of individual choice; Dr. Cuellar
did not feel he had authority to dictate how another adult
chooses to spend his or her own time.

or. Cuellar himself

drinks at times and did so after hours on the weekend trips.
[R. 653, pp. 28, 51, 55).

The students were also told that,

if they chose to drink on the trips, they would have to bring
their own beverage with them since none would be furnished by
the University or bought with the class food money.

[R. 652,

p. 51).

The students understood in advance that Dr. Cuellar did
not view his role on field trips as that of a "babysitter."
[R. 651, p. 22-23).

His policy was to treat his students as

adults who were capable of taking care of themselves unless
they indicated otherwise, and who did not require or want him
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to police their morals or stick his nose in their personal
affairs.

This policy was appreciated by the students and had

been followed on prior field trips without abuse.

[R. 652,

p. 6 9 : 6 5 3 , pp. 2 8 , 3 3] •

Plaintiff predictably enjoyed the field trips more than
the bookwork.

She had prior hiking and camping experience,

good vision, and was in good physical condition from jogging,
skiing, and lifting weights.

[R. 652, pp. 75, 115).

She

therefore had no trouble keeping up with the other class
members on field trip hikes and other physical activities.
(R. 653, p. 63].

With one minor exception, her participation

in the class and field trips was totally uneventful until her
accident on the final night of the final trip.
This one exception occurred on the first night of the
first weekend field trip to Lake Powell.

Counsel for plain-

tiff repeatedly argues that on that occasion plaintiff became
"lost" and "disoriented" while trying to find her sleeping
bag.

Plaintiff argues this one incident establishes that

Dr. Cuellar had prior notice that she would become lost, disoriented and have "problems" on the night of her accident.
[R. 680, 682, 691-92: Brief of Appellant, pp. 18-24].
Plaintiff's own testimony disposes of this argument.

The

purpose of the trip to Lake Powell was to observe the plant
and animal life of Utah's southern region.
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(R. 653, p. 34].

On the first night of that trip plaintiff became a little
"happy drunk" on some wine she had brought with her from
home.

[R. 652, pp. 54, 57, 83-84].

Plaintiff's own testi-

mony concerning what happened is as follows:

Q.
Did you ever have any trouble finding your
way back to your sleeping bag?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Tell me about that.

A.
Okay.
I got up from the camp fire, had to
go to the bathroom, went in the trees to go to the
bathroom, started feeling a little bit woozy, sick
to my stomach, laid down to get myself feeling
better, and fell asleep.

Q.
Was it--I take it was a warm night wherever you were?

know?

A.

Yes.

Q.

How long did you lay there asleep; do you

A.

An hour.

Q.

Who found you?

A.

Orlando and David and Gordon.

Q.

What did they do when they found you?

A.

Took me back to my sleeping bag.

Then they came and found me.

Then the next morning you woke up with
Q.
your just desserts?
A.

(Nodding).

Q.

A hangover of some sort?
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A.

And everybody teasing me.

[R. 652, pp. 58-59] •
A.
I wasn't feeling woozy at the campfire.
It wasn't until I had gone to the bathroom that I
felt woozy.

Q.
Okay. And how far was it from the campfire out to the bathroom area?
A.

I don't remember.

Q.

Any estimate?

A.

Oh, a tree about 50 yards away.

Q.
Okay. And then from the bathroom area
where did you go when you started to feel woozy?
A.

I laid down.

Q.

Right out there?

A.

Right there.

[R. 652, pp. 81-82].
Plaintiff apologized to Dr. Cuellar the next morning.
She asked him not to hold her conduct against her, saying it
wasn't like her to act like that and it would not happen
again.

[R. 652, pp. 60, 93-94: 653, pp. 25, 61].
D.

The Deep Creek Field Trip

The trip to the Deep Creek Mountain range was the final
field trip of the quarter.

It was scheduled as a four-day

trip over the Memorial Day weekend.

As with the prior trips,

Ron Stewart told the students in advance about the area they
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would visit, its terrain, and what clothes and personal gear
he planned to take.

[R. 492-93; 652, p. 108].

Plaintiff,

now a veteran of five class field trips (including two
weekend trips), did not ask any questions about the area or
what to bring.

[R. 494].

The students traveled out to the Deep Creeks in two
groups.

Dr. Cuellar took a group of volunteers out on

Thursday to set up camp and mark lizards for class observation the next day.

They established camp on the same site

used by Dr. Cuellar on all of his prior trips to the area.
[R. 249-50; 653, p. 75].

Plaintiff went out with Ron Stewart

[R. 652, p. 109; 653, p.

in the second group on Friday.
84].

Before dinner that evening Dr. Cuellar took the

students on a hike up in the foothills west of the campsite
to a point where they could view the area and orient themselves.

[R. 652, p. 115-16].

Photographs showing the camp-

site and surrounding area have been made part of the record.
[Black notebook binder; R. 238-250].

In addition, defendants

Cuellar and Stewart drew diagrams of the area during their
depositions.

[Appendix "A"].

A chronology of the events of

this field trip has also been prepared to provide an overview
of what occurred.

[Appendix "B"].

It is respectfully

suggested that the Court examine these photographs, diagrams
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and chronology at this time for a better understanding of the
area and the events which follow.
The campsite was bordered on the east by Dr. Cuellar's
research site and on the west by Red Cedar Creek and the
access road.

The students selected their own tentsites at

the campground.

Most of the students chose to set up their

tents and sleeping bags in the same general area, a flat spot
on the east side of the irrigation stream approximately 100125 feet from Dr. Cuellar's tent at the central campsite.
[R. 652, pp. 114-15; Photo 4).
On Saturday morning the students tracked lizards and did
other class work until 2:00 p.m.
pp. 86-87).
in the hills.

[R. 652, pp. 122-23; 653,

They then ate lunch and went for a nature hike
[R. 554; 652, pp. 122-23).

Later that

afternoon they made the twenty mile drive to nearby Callao
and visited the ranch of Cecil Garland, a local rancher
Dr. Cuellar knew from his prior trips.

[R. 653, pp. 87-88).

With the Garlands' permission the class went swimming (or
bathing) in a pond on the ranch.

[R. 652, p. 130].

While at

the pond they met several area residents who invited
Dr. Cuellar and the students to a holiday lambroast on Sunday
evening.

[R. 652, pp. 125-26; 653, p. 108).

The lambroast

was an annual event sponsored by the area residents.
652, P· 125-126].

[R.

Dr. Cuellar and his classes had been
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invited to the roast in prior years and he had told plaintiff's class that if there was a lambroast they would likely
be invited.
go.

[R.

(R. 653, p. 77).

The students all wanted to

652, pp. 127-28).

The class returned from the Garland ranch and started
dinner.

They were joined at the camp by Dr. Cuellar's family

and the family of his neighbor, Olaf Holmoe, who had come out
to join him for the holiday weekend.

While dinner was being

prepared by Dr. Cuellar, most of the students, including
plaintiff, rappelled off the rocks west of the campsite with
Brett Nye, a class member and experienced rappeller.
555-56; 652, pp. 123-24; photo 9).

[R.

The rappelling was not

part of the field work and no one was required to participate; however, Dr. Cuellar did check the rappelling equipment with Brett Nye to make sure it was safe.
97).

[R. 653, p.

Ironically, the rappelling rock used by the students

was almost directly above the smaller rocks where plaintiff
had her accident the next night.

[Photo 8).

On Sunday morning the students went for another hike in
the mountains and looked at Indian pictographs.
107).

[R. 653, p.

They returned to camp in the early afternoon, ate

lunch, and were dismissed for the day.

The plaintiff then

took a bath in Red Cedar Creek and prepared to go to the
lambroast.

[R. 559; 652, p. 131).
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She also moved her

sleeping bag into her friend Carolie Parker's tent because of
a threat of rain.

The tent was beside Red Cedar Creek, adja-

cent to another stone crossing near where plaintiff bathed.
(R. 652, pp. 127, 131-32; photos 1 and 4).

Plaintiff covered

the distance between Carolie's tent and the central campsite
several times before going to the lambroast.

[R. 652, p.

132].
Plaintiff arrived at the lambroast at about 6:30 p.m.
652, p. 142).

[R.

Some of the area residents, including Juab

county Sheriff Kerry Adams and his family and local federal
Bureau of Land Management people, were already there.
243; 653, p. 118].

[R.

Plaintiff mingled with the locals and

sampled a glass or two of the home-brewed beer that was
available.

[R. 652, pp. 145-148; photo 10).

sweet cider taste and was not very strong.
653, p. 124].

The beer had a
[R. 652, p. 147;

A short time after she arrived plaintiff met a

woman she had seen before at the University.

The woman was a

belly-dancer and took plaintiff away from the group for a
short belly-dancing lesson.

[R. 652, p. 145).

The women

then returned to the main group and plaintiff ate dinner
between 8:00 and 8:30 p.m.

[R. 652, pp. 144, 151, 155).

After dinner plaintiff had a mixed drink, Jack Daniels and
Coke, offered her by Dr. Cuellar's neighbor, Olaf Holmoe.
Over the next few hours she mingled some more and had one
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more beer.

[R. 652, pp. 152-53, 157-58, 160).

She testified

she felt fine during the party and had no trouble walking,
talking or belly-dancing.

[R. 652, pp. 148-49, 161).

Plaintiff rode back from the roast with Dr. Cuellar in
the University van.

On the way back to camp plaintiff oat in

the back of the van with Mr. Holmoe and took a couple of nips
(between 2 and 4) of his remaining Jack Daniels.
161-65).

(R. 652, p.

Contrary to plaintiff's argument, Dr. Cuellar was

unaware plaintiff and Mr. Holmoe were drinking in the back of
the van, just as he did not know for certain if plaintiff had
been drinking at the lambroast.

[R. 653, pp. 125, 127].

Plaintiff and Dr. Cuellar arrived back at the campsite at
between 11:00 and 11:30 p.m.

[R. 652, p. 165).

A lantern

was shining from the pine tree next to the campfire.
652, p. 167; 653, p. 128).

[R.

Ron Stewart was already there,

having returned earlier with some students who did not want
to stay at the lambroast.

They had already turned in for the

night when plaintiff arrived.

[R. 575; 652, p. 164; 653, p.

125].
As plaintiff got out of the van at the campsite she felt
oriented to time, place and who she was with, walked and
talked normally, and had no problem exiting the van.
652, p. 162, 166, 171-72,)

[R.

She started to follow the others

across the stone creek crossing next to the cooking area.
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She stopped, deciding she could get to her tent more easily
by following the footpath up to the other stone crossing next
to her tent where she had bathed earlier that day.

[R. 652,

pp. 132-33, 168; 651, pp. 23-24).
Plaintiff followed the footpath along the west side of
the irrigation stream to a point where the trees were thick
and she could no longer see the glow from the campsite
lantern.

[R. 652, pp. 168-169, 174-175; photo 3).

She was

familiar with the footpath and although it was dark and
cloudy she was still able to distinguish the path from the
rocks.

[R. 651, pp. 18-19, 23).

When she reached a point

where she was having difficulty seeing she decided she needed
help.

She sat down on a rock and called out.

169, 176-177).

[R. 652, pp.

She soon stopped calling, believing no one

could hear her over the strong wind and rushing water of the
creek.

[R. 652, p. 169)

Plaintiff felt "lost" at this point and worried that she
might be wandering near the rocks west of camp where she had
earlier hiked and rappelled.
and 11).

[R. 651, p. 19; photos 2, 3, 8

Conscious of that possibility, she decided to

follow the footpath back down to the vehicles and cross the
irrigation stream by the lantern.
19).

[R. 652, p. 177; 651, p.

She got up and started to retrace her route.
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[R. 652,

pp. 169-170, 177].

She remembers nothing more until she

awoke in the hospital the next day.

(R. 652, pp. 169-170).

Ron Stewart was awakened at about 6:00 a.m. by Carolie
Parker asking if he had seen plaintiff.

[R. 578]

Since

plaintiff was usually one of the last people to turn in at
night she had not been missed the night before.
118-19].

[R. 652, pp.

Ron got dressed and started searching for plaintiff

with Carolie and a few of the other students.

[R.

579]

After searching for a short time, Ron returned to camp and
found Dr. Cuellar organizing another search party.

[R. 579].

The class made several searches of the campsite and surrounding area without success.

Mrs. Cuellar drove to nearby

Trout Creek to get the sheriff.

[R. 653, p. 162).

The

sheriff soon arrived and reported he had ordered a search and
rescue party from Nephi.
At 12:15 p.m. Ron Stewart finally found plaintiff in a
narrow crevice in the rocks to the west of the campsite.
653, p. 163].

[R.

As it turned out, some of the searchers had

earlier walked over the rocks directly above where plaintiff
lay, but could not see her because of her position.

[R. 584;

653, p. 159; photos 8, 11, 12 and 13).
Dr. Cuellar and Ron Stewart examined plaintiff's condition.

Fearing she may have sustained a head, neck or back

injury they did not move her.

They covered her with blankets
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and coats to guard against further hypothermia.
653, p. 163-164].
for help.

[R. 592-94;

The sheriff radioed the airport in Delta

The Life Flight helicopter subsequently arrived

from Salt Lake City and took plaintiff to LDS Hospital where
she was treated for her injuries.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
DEFENDANTS HAD NO DUTY TO WARN PLAINTIFF OF
OPEN AND OBVIOUS CONDITIONS ON THE FIELD
TRIP, NOR TO SUPERVISE HER AT ALL TIMES SO
AS TO PROTECT HER FROM HER OWN CARELESSNESS.
Under Utah law, "a finding of negligence requires the
presence of certain elements, one of which is a duty running
between the parties."
(Utah 1979).

Hughes v. Housley, 599 P.2d 1250, 1253

Without the breach of a duty recognized by law

there can be no recovery; "negligence in the air, so to
speak, will not do."
ed. 1929).

F. Pollack, Law of Torts, p. 468 (12th

The determination of whether a duty exists is a

question of law for the court, despite plaintiff's contrary
wish to make it a jury question.
The threshold question before this Court is whether
defendants owed plaintiff a duty which would support her
negligence claims.

Plaintiff's action can be distilled down

to two general claims:

(1) defendants were negligent in

choosing a campsite dangerous to plaintiff; and (2)
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defendants were negligent in failing to supervise plaintiff
and protect her from injuring herself.

In ruling on defen-

dants' Motion for Summary Judgment the lower court did not
decide the question of whether defendants owed plaintiff a
duty to protect her from harm under the circumstances of this
case.

[R. 398-399).

Judge Hanson left that issue of first

impression for decision by this Court since he did not feel
its resolution was necessary to decide defendants' motion.
For purposes of ruling on the motion, Judge Hanson assumed
defendants owed plaintiff a duty of care, but found no breach
of any duty upon the undisputed facts of this case.
A.

Campsite Selection

Defendants acknowledge that university instructors who
choose to conduct off-campus field trips have a duty to
select a site which suits instructional needs without presenting an unreasonable risk of harm to the students.

The

university places a high priority on both the education and
safety of its students.
Clearly, however, Dr. Cuellar's selection of the Deep
Creek Mts. as a field trip site meets both pre-requisites.
First, the area provided the students a firsthand view of
certain biological and ecological principles, e.g. the
interface between a western desert and a mountain range of
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the northern great basin, and a chance to learn techniques of
scientific field observation by use of Dr. Cuellar's research
project.

Second, the area had proven itself safe.

Dr. Cuellar had been there with other classes, and on his
own, many times before May 1979, without an accident.

He

considered the area safe enough to have his wife and
children, and a neighbor's family, join the class for the
weekend.

As recognized by the lower court, the photographs

of the area show there are no unusual hazards posing any
danger to a person exercising normal caution on his or her
own behalf.

[R. 401].

The only danger plaintiff complains

of, the rocks, were away from the campsite and in full view
of any sighted person.
Utah law does not impose on these defendants a duty to
warn or protect plaintiff from injuring herself by climbing
and falling off visible rocks.

It is presumed an adult will

use due care to protect himself from hazards which are open
and obvious.

There were no unusual dangers hidden in this

particular rock formation.

Hiking and climbing rocks during

the night at any other location would be equally dangerous.
This is the type of risk which anyone of adult age must be
taken to appreciate.

Wold v. Ogden City, 123 Utah 270, 258 P.2d

453, 456 (1953); W. Prosser, Law of Torts,
ed. 1971).

§

68, p. 448 (4th

Consequently, there is no duty to warn or protect
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another against such a danger.

Moore v. Burton Lumber &

Hardware Company, 631 P.2d 865, 868 (Utah 1981).

Momentary

inattentiveness will not excuse a person's disregard for her
own safety if she is concious of the potential hazard.
(A] plaintiff who has been for a substantial length
of time in the vicinity of a dangerous situation will
be taken to have discovered and to understand the
normal, ordinary risks involved in that situation
• Once the plaintiff fully understands the risk,
the fact that he has momentarily forgotten it will
not protect him.
In the usual case, his knowledge
and appreciation of the danger will be a question for
the jury; but where it is clear that any person of
normal intelli ence in his osition must have understoo t e
the issue may
y t e
court.

w.

Prosser, Law of Torts, S 68, pp. 448-49 (4th ed. 1971)

[Emphasis added].
Plaintiff Beach was fully aware of the rocks and the
danger they posed.

She was of above average intelligence.

She had been in the area two full days when the accident
occurred.

She was oriented to the area with the other

students the first evening of the field trip by means of a
hike above these same rocks.

She rappelled from the rocks

the day before the accident.

She was in good physical condi-

tion.

By her

admission she was not incapacitated on the

night of the accident; she had admittedly been drinking that
evening, but was not drunk.

She was well-oriented, and was

walking and talking normally when she got back from the
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lambroast. 2

Against this backdrop plaintiff walked a

distance of over 150 feet across flat ground up into and off
of uneven rocks which she admits being able to distinguish
from the desert surface even in the dark.

Q,
In walking, as you walked upon these
surfaces, you were not able to distinguish between
flat ground and mountainous terrain?
A.
Yes, you could distinguish the
difference. That's why I decided to turn around.
Q.

Why?

A.
Because it seemed like I was heading into
more of the cliffy area than staying flat.
[ R. 6 51, p. 19) •
Despite ignoring accountability for her own actions, and
despite having no explanation for how the accident occurred,
plaintiff nevertheless claims the site selection was negligent because (1) it was a remote and desolate spot (Brief of
Appellant, p. 8), (2)

it was too rugged for a freshman course

with no prerequisite of camping skills (Brief of Appellant,
pp. 4-5), and (3)

it was dangerous because of defendants'

2rt would make no difference if plaintiff was intoxicated. Voluntary intoxication does not excuse the degree of
care which plaintiff must exercise for her own safety. Folda
v. City of Bozeman, 582 P.2d 767, 772 (Mont. 1978).
Furthermore, plaintiff may not rely on her own violation of Utah law
to bolster her claim; she was under the age of 21 at the time
of the accident (a fact unknown to Dr. Cuellar or Ron
and was prohibited by Utah law from consuming alcoholic beverages. See discussion
at page 40.
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knowledge of plaintiff's particular "problems" (Brief of
Appellant, p. 24).
The field trip site was admittedly removed 125 plus miles
from the University campus and was located in a region with
both desert and mountain areas.

This was intended.

It is

impossible to stimulate adult learning by giving a firsthand
demonstration of the course subject in Dr. Cuellar's back
yard or a picnic ground.

Plaintiff has failed to show how

this "remoteness" contributed in any way to her accident.
The same accident could have happened in City Creek Canyon or
a similar locale with the same unfortunate result.

Any area,

including a local park, can pose a danger if people fail to
avoid obvious hazards.
With respect to camping skills, any person who can see,
walk, and unzip a sleeping bag possesses the requisite skills
needed for this particular endeavor, as the photographs
illustrate.

Plaintiff was also told on the first day of

class about the field trips, where and when they would be
held, and to drop the class if participation would be a problem.

Several students did drop out after this orientation

lecture, but not plaintiff.

Furthermore, prior to each trip

plaintiff was told about the area to be visited, its terrain,
and what gear was recommended.

By the time of the Deep Creek

trip plaintiff was a veteran of two prior overnight trips.
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She was athletic, in good physical condition, and had no
trouble keeping up with the other students in any of the
field trip activities.
Finally, plaintiff makes the bootstrap argument that
defendants were negligent in selecting the site because of
their knowledge of her "problems" with becoming disoriented
in the dark after drinking.

The sole incident offered to

establish this "problem" was the innocent occurrence on the
first night of the Lake Powell trip when plaintiff went to
the "ladies room" in the trees 50 yards from the campsite,
laid down and fell asleep.

Plaintiff's own testimony, as

recounted in the statement of facts, dispels any notion that
she was disoriented in any way on that occasion or had a
special problem with orientation at night.
The lower court found "no evidence that would suggest
negligence in the selection of the field trip site."
401].

[R.

As shown above, the record on appeal supports that

conclusion.

The lower court was correct in dismissing plain-

tiff's claim of negligent site selection since, as a matter
of law, any reasonable person must be aware of the clear,
open and obvious hazard posed by climbing onto and falling
off of large rocks at night.

It is plaintiff's own duty to

protect herself from this sort of risk.
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Just as a landowner

is not the insurer of a careless invitee, so these defendants
are not the insurers of careless or absent-minded adults.
B.

Campsite Supervision

Whether a university and its employees have a legal duty
to control and supervise the activity of an adult student
during the non-instructional portion of an off-campus field
trip is a question of first impression in this jurisdiction.
As a general rule, the law imposes no duty on one person
to protect the person of another from injury in the absence
of some special relationship which justifies creating a
duty.

Cramer v. Mengerhausen, 550 P.2d 740, 743 (Or. 1976);

57 Am. Jur. 2d 389, Negligence S 41;

s

w.

Prosser, Law of Torts

56, p. 341 (4th ed. 1971); Restatement (Second) of Torts

S 314 (1965).

This rule applies even where minimal effort or

expense would provide adequate protection.

Restatement

(Second) of Torts S 314, comments a, c (1965).

Examples of

the types of relationships which have been found to give rise
to a duty to protect another are innkeeper-guest, common
carrier-passenger, and landowner-invitee.

s

Prosser, Law of

56, p. 341-42 (4th ed. 1971); 57 Am. Jur. 2d 384,

Negligence
(1965).

w.

§

37; Restatement (Second) of Torts S 314A

The duty, when applicable, is to use reasonable care

under the circumstances to protect the other against an
unreasonable risk of physical harm of which the defendant
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knows or should know.

Restatement (Second) of Torts §

314A,

comments d, e (1965).

In the past, some courts found the

requisite "special relationship" in a school setting by
application of the doctrine of in loco parentis.

Under this

doctrine a school was deemed to stand in place of the parents
with the power to discipline and control its students.

With

this power came a concomittant duty to protect the students
from a risk of physical harm.

The basis for the doctrine was

that students are immature minors incapable of exercising
good judgment on their own behalf.
The in loco parentis doctrine is neither appropriate nor
applicable in a modern University setting.

Compulsory educa-

tion and societal developments have heightened the awareness
of modern-day students and accelerated their maturation
process.

Evidence of this development may be seen in the

reduction in the legal age of majority and the right to vote
from 21 to 18.

The in loco parentis doctrine has now been

superseded by a recognition that college students are not
only able to care for their own needs and handle their own
affairs, but demand the right to do so.

See Healy v. James,

408 U.S. 169 (1972); Pratz v. Louisiana Polytechnic Inst.,
316 F. Supp. 872, n.2 (W.D. La.), aff'd 401 U.S. 1004 (1970);
Buttney v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280, 286 (D. Colo. 1968).
Modern colleges and universities are no longer free to police
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and control the private lives of their students.

As a

result, the courts are increasingly reluctant to impose a
duty on universities to supervise and protect students from a
risk of physical harm outside an instructional setting.
In Hegel v. Langsam, 273 N.E.2d 351 (Ohio Misc. 1971),
the parents of a female student sued a university and its
employees alleging that they allowed their daughter, a minor,
to associate with criminals, be seduced, become a drug user
and be absent from her dormitory.

The court granted the

defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings stating:
In our opinion plaintiffs completely misconstrues the duties and functions of a university. A
university is an institution for the advancement of
knowledge and learning. It is neither a nursery
school nor a prison. No one is required to attend.
Persons who • • • are permitted to attend • • • must
be presumed to have sufficient maturity to conduct
their own personal affairs.
We know of no requirement of the law and none
has been cited to us placing on a university or its
employees any duty to regulate the private lives of
their students, to control their comings and goings
and to supervise their associations.
273 N.E.2d at 352.
Similarly, in Randolph v. Arizona Board of Regents, 505
P.2d 559 (Ariz. App.), rev. den. (1973), the plaintiff, a black
from New Jersey, was admitted to the University of Arizona and
thereafter contracted Valley Fever, a rare disease present in
the area.

The disease occurs some twenty to thirty times more

frequently in blacks than caucasians.
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The plaintiff claimed

that the university, which had openly solicited applications
for admission, had a duty to inform him of the presence of the
disease in the Tucson area.

The lower court granted the

defendant's Motion to Dismiss.

The Court of Appeals affirmed,

holding that the University did not have a duty to warn the
plaintiff of the disease.

The court reasoned:

"There comes a

time when an individual must take it upon himself to be responsible for his own education and well-being.

No person can be

insulated against all the risks of living."

505 P.2d at 561.

A university's duty to supervise its adult students was
addressed by the Louisiana Court of Appeals in Perkins v. State
Board of Education, 364 So. 2d 183 (La. App. 1978).

In that

case a 34-year-old university student was injured while practicing an elementary surface dive after class in a life-saving
course.

The class instructor was nearby acting as a life-

guard.

The student sued the university alleging that he had

not received adequate instruction or supervision.
court granted judgment for the defendant.

The lower

In affirming the

lower court's decision, the court of appeals noted that it is
not the duty of the school board to see that each student is
personally supervised during every moment of each school day.
Schools are not insurers of student safety, but are only
required to exercise that degree of reasonable supervision
commensurate with the age of the student and any known dangers
posed by the activity.

364 So. 2d at 185.
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Two even more recent cases demonstrate the continued extension of this no-duty rule.

Both involve the consumption of

alcohol by students not of age and the impact of university
regulations prohibiting such consumption, elements also present
in this case.

In Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135 (3rd Cir.)

modifying, 464 F. Supp. 175 (E.D. Pa. 1979), plaintiff
Bradshaw, an 18-year-old college student, attended a sophomore
class picnic held off-campus.

Beer was openly consumed at the

picnic, although the legal drinking age in Pennsylvania is 21.
Rawlings, also under 21, was at the picnic and became intoxicated.

Later Rawlings and Bradshaw left the picnic in

Rawlings' car.

Rawlings lost control of the vehicle and

collided with an oncoming car.

The accident rendered Bradshaw

quadriplegic.
Bradshaw filed suit naming the college as a defendant.

The

lower court submitted the case against the college to the jury
on the basis that the college owed the plaintiff a duty of due
care to protect him from an unreasonable risk of harm.

The

jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed,
concluding that the plaintiff had failed as a matter of law to
establish that the college should be charged with the duty of
custodial care.

As stated by the appellate court:
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(A] negligence claim must fail if based on circumstances for which the law imposes no duty of care on
the defendant. "Negligence in the air so to speak,
will not do." • • •
612 F.2d at 138, quoting F. Pollack, Law of Torts 468 (12th ed.
1929).
In reaching its decision the appellate court traced the
development of student emancipation and maturation, and the
co-extensive eroding of the doctrine of in loco parentis.

The

court emphasized that university students are adults, capable
of protecting their own self interests and entitled to the
right to define and regulate their own lives:
Our beginning point is a recognition that the modern
American college is not an insurer of the safety of
its students. Whatever may have been its responsibility in an earlier era, the authoritarian role of
today's college administrations has been notably
diluted in recent decades. Trustees, administrators, and faculties have been required to yield to
the expanding rights and privileges of their
students • • • • [T]hrough the evolution of new
customs, rights formerly possessed by college administrations have been transferred to students.
College students today are no longer minors; they
are now regarded as adults in almost every phase of
community life. For example except for purposes of
purchasing alcoholic beverages, eighteen year old
students are now identified with an expansive bundle
of individual and social interests and possess discrete rights not held by college students from
decades past. There was a time when college administrators and faculties assumed a role in loco
parentis. Students were committed to their charge
because the students were considered minors. A
special relationship was created between college and
that imposed a duty on the college to exercise control over student conduct and reciprocally,
gave the students certain rights of protection by
the college. The campus revolutions of the late
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sixties and early seventies were a direct attack by
the students on rigid controls by the colleges and
were an all-pervasive affirmative demand for more
student rights. • • These movements, taking place
almost simultaneously with legislation and case law
lowering the age of majority, produced fundamental
changes in our society. A dramatic reapportionment
of responsibilities and social interests of general
security took place. Regulation by the college of
student life on and off campus has become limited.
Adult students now demand and receive expanded
rights of privacy in their college life. • • At one
time, exercising their rights and duties in loco
parentis, colleges were able to impose strict regulations. But today students vigorously claim the
right to define and regulate their own lives.
Especially have they demanded and received satisfaction of their interest in self-assertion in both
physical and mental activities, and have vindicated
what may be called the interest in freedom of the
individual will.
612 F.2d at 138-140.
The Bradshaw court also held, contrary to plaintiff's
argument here, that a school regulation prohibiting the
possession or consumption of alcohol by students does not
create a custodial relationship between the university and
student which imposes a duty to protect.
A college regulation that essentially tracks a state
law and prohibits conduct that to students under
twenty-one is already prohibited by state law does
not, in our view, indicate that the college • • •
had voluntarily taken custody of Bradshaw so as to
deprive him of his normal power of self-protection
or to subject him to association with persons
to cause him harm. Absent proof of such a relationship, we do not believe that a prima facie case of
custodial duty was established in order to submit
the case to the jury on this theory.
612 F.2d at 141.
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Relying in part on the Third Circuit's decision in
Bradshaw, a California Court of Appeals recently sustained
the dismissal of a university student's lawsuit against the
university trustees, governing body and dormitory advisers in
3
Baldwin v. Zoradi, 176 Cal. Rptr. 809 (Cal. App. 1981).
In Baldwin, the plaintiff was rendered quadriplegic from
injuries sustained in an automobile accident resulting from a
•speed contest".

The students had been drinking on univer-

sity premises prior to the accident.

As in this case, plain-

tiff Baldwin alleged that the university was negligent in
failing to enforce regulations against student drinking,
thereby aiding the consumption of alcohol by minors in
contravention of state law enacted for the protection of the
public.

The lower court sustained the defendants' demurrer

and the plaintiff appealed.
On appeal, the dismissal was affirmed.

The appellate

court properly recognized that foreseeable harm does not
necessarily give rise to a duty to prevent the harm.
Cal. Rptr. at 816.

176

A duty to protect only arises in a

university setting if there is a special relationship between
the administration and students.

Id.

The court held that

is the.same case relied upon extensively by
plaintiff Beach in support of her argument for a "balancing
test" to establish a duty to protect.
(Brief of Appellant,
pp • 3 2 - 3 3 I 4 Q - 4 3 • ]
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the university regulations against alcohol did not create the
type of dependent relationship necessary to impose on the
university a duty to protect.
Although the consumption of alcoholic beverages
by persons under 21 years of age is proscribed by
law, the use of alcohol by college students is not
so unusual or heinous by contemporary standards as
to require special efforts by college and administrators to stamp it out. Although the university
reserved to itself the right to take disciplinary
action for drinking on campus, this merely follows
state law. The same may be said of the provisions
of the license agreement prohibiting alcoholic
beverages. We do not believe they created a mandatory duty.

* * *
[T]here is an obvious distinction between "giving"
or "furnishing" alcoholic beverages and the failure
to stop a drinking party or parties.
[California
law] prohibiting consumption of alcoholic beverages
on school grounds, imposes upon the university no
duty to enforce the laws.
176 Cal. Rptr. at 817-18.
The California court went on to state that imposing
liability against the university in such circumstances would
extend the "cutting edge of the tort law" one step too far
and undermine important public policy objectives.

176 Cal.

Rptr. at 821.
Even the cases relied upon by plaintiff do not support
the imposition of a "special relationship" and attendant duty
to protect in this case.

All of them deal with clearly dis-

tinguishable factual circumstances, including:

(1) plain-

tiffs who are still miPors: (2) classroom settings or teacher
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directives, and (3) harmful attacks by third persons, but not
situations of self-carelessness.

[Brief of Appellant, pp.

30-36, 44-45].
The modern-day approach to student rights discussed above
is exemplified by Dr. Cuellar's attitude toward plaintiff and
his other students.

He regarded the students as adults and

peers who could, and should, accept responsibility for their
own conduct.

While the students were expected to follow Dr.

Cuellar's instructions during the designated class time, they
were free to use their own time after the field work as they
saw fit.

There were no designated curfews or potentially

embarrassing bed checks.

Dr. Cuellar viewed his role as a

teacher, not a babysitter, deputy sheriff or vice squad
detective.
Dr. Cuellar did not feel, however, that his field trip
policy allowed or required him to turn his back on the needs
of the students.

On the contrary, he recognized his duty to

instruct and supervise the students during the field work
required for the class, just as he would in a campus
classroom.

In addition, both Dr. Cuellar and Ron Stewart

were more than willing to help a student if asked, as would
any friend.

They also felt a moral duty to aid any student

they knew was in danger.

[R. 653, p. 59].

Plaintiff's accident, however, did not occur during the
supervised field work.

It happened late at night, long after
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the day's required class work had been completed.

It

happened on the final night of the final field trip after
plaintiff had already gained experience through three prior
day trips and two prior overnight trips, and had been in this
particular area for two full days.
At the time of her accident plaintiff was just three
months short of her twenty-first birthday.
shows her to be mature and independent.

Her background

As an intelligent,

able and self-sufficient university student plaintiff was
entitled to be treated as an adult.

In return, both logic

and public policy require that she accept adult responsibility for her own conduct.

Plaintiff knew that Dr. Cuellar

would not attempt to police her conduct on the night of the
accident.

She could not reasonably expect otherwise: she was

told at the outset of the class about Dr. Cuellar's policy in
this regard and that policy had been followed on two previous
overnight field trips.
Plaintiff was on her own time the evening of her accident.

She could have stayed within the protection of her own

sleeping bag and tent if she were truly worried or afraid of
the area.

But plaintiff is not that type of person.

She had

hiked, tracked and participated actively in all of the field
trip activities.

She had even rappelled with the others.

She wanted to go to the lambroast, and her choice is understandable.

There was nothing sinister or suspicious about
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the lambroast or Dr. Cuellar's permitting the students to
attend it.

The lambroast was not some drunken orgy.

a family picnic for the area residents.
and his family came.
came.

It was

The county Sheriff

The Bureau of Land Management people

Plaintiff chose to go to the lambroast, participate

(even to the extent of taking a belly-dancing lesson), and
have fun.

No one forced her to drink nor stopped her from

leaving the lambroast earlier with Ron Stewart's group.
Under these circumstances there is no basis for finding a
"special relationship" giving rise to a duty to protect.
Even if this Court should find that a "special relationship" existed between plaintiff and defendants, a duty to
protect would not arise under the undisputed facts in this
case.

As set forth above, a "special relationship" gives

rise only to a duty to protect the party in whose favor the
duty runs against unreasonable risks of harm of which the
defendant knows or should know.

This would of course exclude

risks posed by open and obvious conditions, as discussed
supra.

Plaintiff's brief suggests defendants should have

known that plaintiff was drinking on the night of her accident and would, as a result, become lost and disoriented in
the dark later, as she allegedly had at Lake Powell.

How-

ever, Dr. Cuellar did not learn of plaintiff's plight until
the next morning.

Nor should he have known.

Plaintiff her-

self admits experiencing no difficulty until after the group
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had returned to the campsite and she began to make her way up
the footpath towards the upper stream crossing.

Prior to

that time she had done nothing which would suggest to anyone
that she was a danger to herself or others.
The Lake Powell incident cannot in any way be construed
to give defendants notice of plaintiff's plight on the night
of the accident.

If the Lake Powell incident is supposed to

give defendants notice that plaintiff might become disoriented, it would also give notice that plaintiff knows how to
stay in one place when she becomes disoriented, rather than
wandering around. 4 Based upon plaintiff's own testimony,
the finding of the lower court that defendants Cuellar and
Stewart had no actual or constructive notice that plaintiff
faced a risk of serious harm on the night of her accident is
not only permissible, but the only reasonable conclusion.

4p1aintiff has no recollection of how her accident
occurred. Judging from where she was found she had reached a
position where the lantern light from the campsite should
have been visible. It is not known how the accident
occurred, nor how much time passed between when plaintiff
started back towards the light and her fall. Because of
plaintiff's memory loss, no one will know if in fact she was
still "disoriented" or "lost" when she fell, or whether she
was in the area of the rocks for some reason. Plaintiff's
claims concerning what occurred are self-serving speculation
at best.
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POINT II.
PLAINTIFF MAY NOT RELY ON HER VOLUNTARY
CONSUMPTION OF ALCOHOL TO SUPPORT A CLAIM
OF NEGLIGENCE AGAINST THESE DEFENDANTS.
The majority rule is that a party may not maintain an
action if she must rely on her own violation of some statutory prohibition in order to establish her cause of action.
This is particularly true where a penalty is imposed for
violation of the statute.

Capo v. Century Life Insurance

Company, 610 P.2d 1202, 1205 (N.M. 1980): Henrie v. Griffeth,
395 P.2d 809 (Okla. 1964)

[Mother's wrongful death action for

death of aborted fetus).

If a claimant cannot prove her case

without showing that she has broken the law, the courts will
not assist her.

Farragut Baggage

& Transfer Co. v. Shadron

Realty, Inc., 501 P.2d 38, 42 (Ariz. App. 1972): Wells v.
Comstock, 297 P.2d 961, 963 (Cal. 1956).
In Miller v. City of Portland, 604 P.2d 1261 (Or. 1980),
this general rule was utilized as a public policy consideration in rejecting the claim of an intoxicated minor.

In that

case the plaintiff, a motorcycle passenger, sued the city for
damages arising from a collision with a police car.

The city

filed a third-party complaint against a tavern operator who
had sold liquor to the plaintiff and his driver "when they
were under age and visibly intoxicated."

The trial court

dismissed the third-party complaint but the court of appeals
reversed.
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The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in
part, holding that while an action may be maintained against
a commercial purveyor of liquor for the death of a third
party injured by a minor who was sold liquor illegally, the
under-age customer himself cannot use the statutory violation
as a ground upon which to recover for his own injuries.
ORS 471.430 prohibits minors, under the circumstances here, from purchasing or acquiring alcoholic
liquor and provides a penalty for the violation (a
fine). It would be inconsistent with apparent
legislative policy to reward the violator with a
cause of action based upon the conduct which the
legislature has chosen to prohibit and penalize.
This court has never previously recognized a
common law cause of action in favor of a person who
suffers injury resulting from his or her own consumption of alcohol. Nor have most other courts.
Because it would be contrary to apparent legislative
policy, we also consider it inappropriate to create
a common law cause of action for physical injury to
minors caused by their illegal purchase of alcoholic
liquor.
604 P.2d at 1265.
Another example of the application of this rule is
Vallentine v. Azar, 445 P.2d 449 (Ariz. App. 1968), in which
the plaintiff, who was not quite 21, sustained serious
injuries when he jumped off a roof into a swimming pool while
intoxicated.

He had previously purchased several six-packs

of beer from the defendant in violiation of an Arizona penal
statute prohibiting the sale of liquor to minors.

The

Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed a summary judgment for the

-41-

defendant, refusing to allow civil liability to be premised
on the violation of the penal statute.

The court relied on

the rationale of an earlier case, Collier v. Stamatis, 162
P.2d 125 (Ariz. 1945).
The court's rationale was that the proximate cause
of the confinement of the daughter was the drinking
of alcoholic beverages rather than the sale thereof;
reasoning that the child, at age 15, was capable of
committing a crime under the laws of this State and
therefore capable of voluntary action.
The court
further reasoned that the statute prohibiting sale
of alcoholic beverages was for regulatory purposes
and was not intended to
civil remedies; as a
civil damages or "Dram Shop" act.
445 P.2d at 451.
(Ark. 1965)

See also, Carr v. Turner, 385 S.W.2d 656, 657

[Citing the common law rule]; Ross v. Ross, 200

N.W.2d 149, 150 (Minn. 1972)

["One who voluntarily becomes

intoxicated cannot recover for his own injury under the
Dramshop Act."); Cory v. Shierloh, 629 P.2d 8 (Cal. 1981).
Utah law prohibits the purchase, consumption or possession of any alcoholic beverage by any person under 21 years
of age.

Utah Code Ann. § 32-7-15.4 (1953, as amended).

Violation is punishable as a class B misdemeanor.

In

accord with the authorities cited above, Utah law does not
provide a civil cause of action in favor of a consumer of
alcoholic beverages who injures herself as a result of prohibited or voluntary drinking of alcholic beverage.

Yost v.

640 P.2d 1044 (Utah 1981); Utah Code Ann. § 32-11-1
(1953, as amended).
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Plaintiff Beach alleges she was intoxicated at the time
of her accident (a claim unsupported by the evidence) to
support her claim of negligence against these defendants.

In

doing so she conveniently ignores her own willful and knowing
violation of state laws.

Plaintiff was aware on the night of

her accident that Utah law prohibited her drinking.

She

nevertheless drank beer and whiskey at the lambroast.

It is

not disputed that her actions were voluntary; the defendants
neither forced her to drink nor provided her with any alcoholic beverage.

To the extent plaintiff's claims against

these defendants rely upon her alleged intoxicated condition
the night of the accident her claims must fail as a matter of
law.

Public policy will not permit plaintiff to use her own

knowing violation of state law to establish her claims.

Nor

will her voluntary intoxication excuse her carelessness.
Folda v. City of Bozeman, 582 P.2d 767, 776 (Mont. 1978).
POINT III.
UNIVERSITY REGULATIONS CONCERNING FIELD
TRIPS AND STUDENT CONDUCT DO NOT SUPPORT
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS.
Plaintiff repeatedly argues that had defendants observed
the regulations in the University of Utah's Policy and
Procedures Manual in the conduct of the field trip her accident would not have occurred, and that all she asks is for
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the university to be held to the standard of care it has
itself established by way of these regulations.
Plaintiff's argument fails for two reasons.

First,

university regulations which do nothing more than track state
law, e.g. prohibiting drinking by persons not of age, do not
give rise to a duty to enforce such laws, nor do they create
a custodial relationship giving rise to a duty to protect.
See Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135, 141 (3rd Cir. 1979),
and Baldwin v. Zoradi, 176 Cal. Rptr. 809, 817-18 (Cal. App.
1981), discussed supra at pp. 31-35.

Plaintiff nevertheless

argues that she expected Dr. Cuellar to enforce the regulations from the student code and was surprised when she was
not disciplined for drinking at Lake Powell.
Appellant, pp. 9-11).

[Brief of

Plaintiff apparently hopes this Court

will see her as a toddler who does not know right from wrong
and who is not responsible for her own conduct.

If plain-

tiff's argument is accepted the university paradoxically
becomes responsible for any harm a student may suffer as a
result of any violation of state law or university regulations which he or she can get away with.

If that is the

case, then a highway patrolman, who has duties to members of
the public, may be held liable to plaintiff for personal
injury she sustains in an automobile accident caused by
plaintiff's own speeding if he fails to arrest her as she
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passes him.

Defendants suggest the law is not created to

protect the lawbreaker against the results of his or her own
illegal conduct.
Second, the university field trip regulation plaintiff
claims was not followed in this case was, in fact, followed
by Dr. Cuellar on the Deep Creek field trip.

Policy No. 1-10

was officially enacted eight months following plaintiff's
accident to codify what was regarded as previously existing
procedure.

The policy specifically prohibits drinking of

alcoholic beverages by participants on the field trip during
"working hours," as such are designated by the trip director.

[Brief of Appellant, Appendix 4, ' 8].

The policy also

specifically states that each student participant is expected
to comply with all state and federal laws and is responsible
for his or her personal conduct while on the field trip1 the
University does not undertake to protect the students from
the legal consequences of their own violations of the law.
[Brief of Appellant, Appendix 4, 11 11].
CONCLUSION
The lower court properly held that defendants have not
breached any legally recognized duty owed plaintiff.

Judge

Hanson did not usurp the function of the trier-of-fact, but
made his ruling based upon undisputed facts which entitle

-45-

defendants to judgment as a matter of law.

In a nutshell

these critical undisputed facts are:
1.

At the time of her accident plaintiff was a mautre,

intelligent, physically able adult, who was presumptively
able to care for herself.
2.

There was nothing unusually dangerous or deceptive

about the campsite or surrounding area.
3.

Plaintiff was fully aware of the existence and loca-

tion of the large rocks and must be charged with knowledge of
the danger posed by falling off them.
4.

Plaintiff voluntarily consumed alcohol which was not

furnished to her by these defendants.
5.

Plaintiff did not give prior notice to any defendant

by words or actions that she was unable to care for herself
on the night of the accident.
6.

Although plaintiff has no specific recollection of

the accident itself, it is nevertheless apparent that she had
to have walked across a long expanse of open and relatively
flat ground and then climbed up onto large rocks to get in
the position from which she fell; she had to have known where
she was and what she was doing at the time.
No justification appears from the uncontroverted facts of
the instant case for holding these defendants liable for an
alleged failure to protect plaintiff from her own voluntary
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conduct, short of making the University an absolute insurer
of its students.

To impose such a duty on the University

under the facts of this case would indeed open a Pandora's
Box for all institutions of higher learning.

If liability

could be imposed in the instant case, would there be any
logical limit to the extension of the proposed "no-fault
liability"?

If liable to plaintiff in the instant case,

would the university then be liable to a student:
(a)

Who was injured when, after ingesting a mind-

altering drug, he attempted to fly, without the benefit of
wings, from the roof of the Hotel Utah?
(b)

Who was injured as a result of becoming intoxi-

cated and falling down the bleacher steps while attending a
football game at the university or another college campus?
(c)

Who, as a member of the basketball team,

travels to a distant city and, after the game, becomes intoxicated with other team members and then is injured on his way
back to the motel?
(d)

Who became pregnant or infected with a venereal

disease, on the theory that the university should have performed bed checks, or otherwise monitored the private conduct
of students in a dormitory, in an off-campus apartment, or in
a parked automobile on the local lover's lane?
If the university could be liable under the facts of the
instant case, could the State of Utah be liable for an injury
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sustained in an automobile accident by a drinking driver
simply because state law authorizes and regulates both the
sale of alcohol and the use and operation of motor vehicles?
The answer to these questions is clearly "no," under any
reasonable interpretation of existing law; nevertheless, the
attempt to impose some type of absolute, strict liability on
the University is precisely what plaintiff seeks in this case.
If liability were imposed in this case, the university,
in order to avoid, or minimize, potential budget-busting
liability would be forced to either close its doors or, in
self-protection, attempt to become an Orwellian big brother,
monitoring and supervising every student 24 hours a day,
every day of the year, both on and off campus--a proposition
not only impossible, but repugnant to our notions of individual liberty and self-determination.
The University of Utah, like other institutions of higher
learning, is neither a prison nor a nursery school; yet
accidents and injuries commonly occur even in those closely
supervised settings.

In order to supervise, to plaintiff's

liking, the many thousands of students enrolled at each
college campus in the State of Utah, such institutions would
be forced to subvert their role as educational institutions
to that of custodians.

Such a doctrine would be subversive

of the college's •interest in the nature of its relationship
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with its adult students, as well as an interest in avoiding
responsibilities that it is incapable of performing".
Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135 at 138.

The resultant

transfer of prerogatives and rights from the students back to
the college administrators would also contravene public
policy as noted in Baldwin v. Zoradi, supra:
The transfer of prerogative and rights from college
administrators to the students is salubrious when
seen in the context of the proper goal of postsecondary education--the maturation of the students. Only by giving them responsibilities can
students grow into responsible adulthood. Although
the alleged lack of supervision had a disasterous
result to this plaintiff, the overall policy of
stimulating student growth is in the public interest.
176 Cal. Rptr. at 818.
In the instant case plaintiff was an adult, acted like an
adult, was treated as an adult, and she therefore must accept
adult responsibility for her own conduct.

Any other result

would inflict a staggering potential liability on every
college, institution and organization in the State of Utah
and would be clearly contrary to the public interest.
For the factual, legal and public policy reasons set
forth above, defendants respectfully ask that this Court
affirm the judgment of the lower court.
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DATED this 23rd day of December, 1983.
Respectfully submitted,
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

By

-so-

BRUCE H. JENSEN
Attorneys for
Defendants/Respondents
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APPENDIX B

CHRONOLOGY
This chronology is intended to supplement the Statement
of Facts contained in the defendants' Memorandum in Support
of Summary Judgment by providing an overview of the events
which occurred on the Deep Creek field trip in order of time.
Predictably, this long after the fact there is some confusion
as to the timing of certain events, though it is agreed the
events occurred. For instance, the plaintiff's deposition
testimony establishes that her accident occurred on Saturday
night, yet all other accounts (including the plaintiff's
medical records) agree the accident occurred near midnight
on Sunday night (or Monday morning). Since the exact timing
of the events is unimportant in this case, the parties'
approximations are used and discrepancies are noted.
References are to the depositions.
THURSDAY, MAY 24, 1979
3:00 p.m.

Dr. Cuellar takes four student volunteers from
Biology 180 class out to site to prepare campsite
and mark lizards for class study on following day.

8:00 p.m.

Dr. Cuellar and group arrive at site and set up
camp.

11:00 p.m.

9:00 a.m.
6:00 p.m.

Dr. Cuellar and group retire for night.

-

4:00 p.m.
5:00 p.m.

-

8:00 p.m.
9:00 p.m.

-

11 :00 p.m.

FRIDAY, MAY 25, 1979
Cuellar group spends day marking lizards, making
preparations for field work, and hiking in area.
Ron Stewart takes plaintiff and remainder of class
out to site.
Stewart group arrives at camp while it is light,
orientation hike with Cuellar group, eats
dinner, and sets up tents. The class then sits
around camp fire singing, talking and socializing,
until they retire for night.
[The plaintiff claims
her group arrived at camp between·4:30 p.m. 5:00 p.m. Beach, p. 115.]
The plaintiff retires, has trouble finding sleeping
bag, and is assisted by Gordon Kurz.

APPB!JDIX B

SATURDAY, MAY 26, 1979
10:00 a.m.
2:00 p.m.

-

2:00 p.m.
5:00 p.m.

-

5:00 p.m.
8:00 p.m.

-

Class tracks and observes marked lizards, eats
lunch, and goes on nature hike.
Cuellar takes class to nearby ranch where students
swim in pond and go bird watching. The students
are invited to holiday lambroast on Sunday evening
by local residents.
Class returns to camp. Some students rappel
from nearby rocks while dinner is cooked.
Students eat dinner, then sit around camp fire
singing, talking and socializing, and then later
retire for niqht.

8:00 p.m.

SUNDAY, MAY 27, 1979
A.M. - P.M.

Class takes mountain hike to 9,000 foot level,
obtains samples of plants, and observes ancient
Indian pictographs.
[The plaintiff remembers
seeing the Indian drawings on Saturday. Beach,
p. 122. J

6:00 p.m.

Class cleans up and leaves for holiday lambroast
in nearby canyon.

6:30 p.m.
10:00 p.m.
10:00 p.m.
11:00 p.m.

11: 30 p.m.
12:30 a.m.

-

Class arrives at and participates with local
residents in lambroast.
First group of students returns to camp with
Ron Stewart.
Cuellar group (including Danna Beach) returns
to camp.
[The plaintiff believes her group
returned to camp between 11:00 p.m. and 11:30 p.m.
Beach, p. 165. J
Class retires for night. Subsequently, the
plaintiff's accident occurs.
MONDAY, MAY 28, 1979

6:00 a.m.

Plaintiff's tentrnate, Carolie Parker, notices
she is missing and a search begins.

12:00 p.m.

Ron Stewart finds the plaintiff in a crevice,
and Dr. Cuellar drives to Sheriff's home to
radio for medical assistance.

3:30 p.m. 4:00 p.m.

"Life Flight" helicopter arrives and takes
plaintiff to LDS Hospital. Class breaks camp
and returns to Salt Lake City.
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